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Year	after	year,	 the	senior	managers	of	public	companies	 in	 the	U.S.	
receive	 a	 large	 chunk	 of	 their	 compensation	 in	 the	 form	 of	 company	
equity—stock	 and	 options—and	 year	 after	 year,	 managers	 exercise	
options	and	sell	 shares.	Between	the	 inflow	and	the	outflow	 is	an	equity	
reservoir.	 It	 is	 well	 understood	 among	 economists	 that	 managerial	
incentives	are	shaped	not	just	by	grants	of	stock	and	options,	but	also	by	
their	 overall	 holdings	 in	 those	 reservoirs.1	 The	 size	 and	 composition	 of	
these	 holdings	 are	 shaped	 by	 several	 factors,	 including	 firm	 choices	
regarding	the	amounts	and	types	of	equity	compensation	awarded,	time‐	
and	sometimes	performance‐based	vesting	restrictions	on	equity	awards,	
and,	 in	 the	 case	of	 stock	 options,	 stock	price	performance,	 since	options	




In	 “Stock	 Unloading	 and	 Banker	 Incentives,”	 Professor	 Jackson	
investigates	whether	public	disclosure	of	stock	sales	by	managers	impacts	
the	 size	 of	 equity	 holdings.2	 Specifically,	 Jackson	 investigates	 the	
relationship	 between	 public	 disclosure	 and	 the	 magnitude	 of	
dispositions—which	 he	 refers	 to	 as	 “unloadings”—but	what	 he	 is	 really	
 
*	 Professor	 of	 Law,	 Maurice	 Poch	 Faculty	 Research	 Scholar,	 and	 Associate	 Dean	 for	
Academic	Affairs,	Boston	University	School	of	Law.	I	thank	Robert	Jackson	for	his	Essay,	for	
his	 insightful	 comments	 on	 this	 response,	 and	 for	 a	 number	 of	 fascinating	 and	 very	
enjoyable	exchanges	on	this	topic.	
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concerned	 about	 is	 the	 impact	 of	 disclosure	 on	 the	 size	 of	 the	 equity	
reservoirs.	Jackson	posits	that	public	disclosure	of	stock	sales	by	company	
executives	subject	 to	 the	reporting	requirements	of	section	16(a)3	of	 the	
Securities	Exchange	Act	of	19344	may	deter	these	individuals	from	selling,	
which	would	increase	equity	holdings,	all	else	being	equal.5	The	reason,	in	
a	 nutshell,	 is	 that	 dispositions	 that	 are	 driven	 solely	 by	 diversification	
needs	 may	 be	 misinterpreted	 by	 the	 market,	 by	 colleagues,	 or	 by	 the	
financial	press	as	signaling	a	lack	of	confidence	in,	or	commitment	to,	the	
firm.	
Next,	 utilizing	 a	 unique	 set	 of	 publicly	 available,	 but	 previously	
ignored	data	on	stock	sales	by	senior	managers	at	Goldman	Sachs,	Jackson	










glass	 is	 both	 half‐empty	 and	 half‐full.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 Jackson	 is	
optimistic	 that	 expanding	 the	 reach	 of	 public	 disclosure	 of	 stock	 sales	
could	 be	 a	 means	 of	 increasing	 equity	 holdings	 by	 managers	 at	 public	
companies	 who	 are	 not	 subject	 to	 section	 16(a),	 which	 might	 improve	
managerial	 incentives.	 But	 he	 finds	 the	 impact	 of	 public	 disclosure	
troubling	 in	 the	 context	 of	 financial	 institutions,	where	 some	worry	 that	
concentrated	 equity	 holdings	 by	 bank	 managers	 may	 fuel	 excessive	
risktaking.	Given	 that	concern,	 Jackson	argues	 that	bank	regulators	need	
information	 on	 reservoir	 size,	 not	 just	 information	 on	 inflows	 and	
outflows.11	


















data	 on	 equity	 dispositions	 by	 managers	 not	 subject	 to	 section	 16(a)	
reporting	 requirements.	 To	 be	 sure,	 this	 data	 does	 present	 some	




believe	 he	 marshals	 convincing	 evidence	 that	 public	 disclosure	 has	
affected	stock	sales	by	Goldman’s	managers.	
Professor	Jackson’s	brief	Essay	raises	many	important	issues,	many	of	
which	 I	will	not	be	able	 to	address	 in	 this	 short	 response.	 Instead,	 I	will	
focus	on	the	relationship	between	public	disclosure	and	managerial	equity	
retention,	which	I	believe	lies	at	the	heart	of	his	analysis.	Consistent	with	
Jackson’s	 organizational	 approach,	 I	 will	 begin	with	 a	 section	 on	 theory	
and	 then	 discuss	 the	 data	 and	 its	 interpretation.	 In	 an	 effort	 to	 provide	
value	to	the	reader	of	this	response,	I	will	highlight	some	of	what	I	view	as	
the	limitations	of	the	analysis	and	interpretation,	but	these	points	should	





Let	 me	 return	 to	 the	 reservoir	 analogy,	 which	 I	 believe	 is	 apt	 for	
thinking	 about	 firm	 equity	 held	 by	 a	 “hired”	 manager.	 At	 most	 public	
companies,	the	size	and	composition	of	managerial	equity	holdings	reflect	
a	 tension	 between	 the	 shareholders’	 interest	 in	 having	 managers	 hold	
sufficient	equity	to	align	the	interests	of	the	two	groups	and	the	managers’	
disinclination	to	hold	so	much	firm	equity	that	they	become	badly	under‐
diversified.	 Since	 managers	 demand	 to	 be	 compensated	 for	 that	 under‐
diversification,	 company	 directors	 overseeing	 managerial	 equity	
reservoirs	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 shareholders	 balance	 the	 interest	 alignment	
benefit	 against	 the	 cost	 of	 suboptimal	 managerial	 diversification.12	 Of	
course,	 this	 picture	 does	 not	 describe	 all	 executives.	 Some	 executives,	
often	 founders,	 hold	 sufficient	 equity	 to	 control	 the	 firm	 and	 see	 great	
value	 in	 that	 control.	 But	 the	 typical	 “hired”	 manager	 of	 a	 large	 public	
 
12. The	 approach	 described	 in	 the	 text	 reflects	 the	 optimal	 contracting	 view	 of	 the	
executive	 compensation	 process	 that	 is	 generally	 adopted	 in	 the	 corporate	 finance	
literature.	See	Core,	et	al.,	supra	note	1,	at	32,	36.	This	view	is	basically	uncontested	in	the	
context	of	 junior	managers.	Some	believe	 that	senior	executives	have	significant	 influence	










of	 Goldman	 are	 signatories	 to	 a	 shareholders’	 agreement	 that	 obligates	
them	to	hold	at	least	25%	of	the	equity	granted	to	them	(calculated	on	an	
after‐tax	 basis).15	 Very	 senior	 executives	 are	 obligated	 to	 hold	 at	 least	
75%	 of	 after‐tax	 equity.16	 At	 most	 firms,	 minimum	 equity	 holdings	 are	
determined	indirectly	by	the	vesting	provisions	that	are	placed	on	equity	
grants.17	Despite	 this	 innovation,	we	can	still	 think	of	managerial	 equity	
holdings	at	Goldman	as	reservoirs—reservoirs	that	grow	by	at	least	25%	
of	every	new	grant	of	stock	or	options.	
The	 reservoir	 analogy	 should	 be	 helpful	 in	 thinking	 about	 the	
appropriate	 baseline	 relationship	 between	 new	 equity	 grants,	 equity	
holdings,	and	managerial	incentives.	At	times,	Jackson	appears	to	adopt	a	
baseline	 of	 complete	 retention	 of	 equity	 grants.	 Finding	 that	 Goldman	
managers	sell	0.8	shares	for	each	new	share	received,	Jackson	states	that	
these	 managers	 “diversify	 away	 most	 of	 the	 incentive	 effects	 of	 their	
stock‐based	 pay.”18	 Jackson’s	 statement	 is	 literally	 true.	 The	 incentives	
created	by	actual	equity	holdings	are	quite	different	than	those	that	would	
be	created	by	the	same	pattern	of	equity	grants	with	no	dispositions.	But	
why	 is	 that	 the	baseline?	The	 implication	 is	 that	greater	retention	would	
better	 align	 the	 incentives	 of	 managers	 with	 shareholders,	 but	 this	
assumes	 that	 grant	 decisions	 are	 made	 independently	 of	 disposition	
decisions,	and,	in	fact,	we	know	that	they	are	not.19	If	managers	retained	
 
13. See,	 e.g.,	Core,	 et	 al.,	 supra	note	1,	 at	38	 (noting	 that	 “a	 rational,	 risk‐averse	CEO	
would	hold	no	stock	in	her	firm	(in	the	absence	of	private	information)”).	
14. Goldman	 Sachs	 appears	 to	 be	 unique	 in	 binding	 a	 large	 number	 of	managers	 to	
equity	 retention	 targets.	 Most	 large	 public	 companies	 have	 share	 ownership	 targets	 for	
their	CEOs	and	sometimes	other	senior	executives.	See	Frederic	W.	Cook	&	Co.,	Executive	





15. See	 Amended	 and	 Restated	 Shareholders’	 Agreement,	 in	 Goldman	 Sachs	 Grp.	
Annual	 Report	 (Form	 10‐K)	 Ex.	 10.6,	 art.	 II,	 §	2.1(a)	 (Feb.	 26,	 2010).	 The	 agreement	
excludes	 from	 the	 calculation	 sufficient	 shares	 to	 pay	 the	 tax	 due	 on	 vesting	 or	 option	
exercise	and	includes	only	the	net	shares	received	on	option	exercise.	See	id.	art.	I,	§	1.1(h).	
16. See	id.	art.	II,	§	2.1(b).	





level	 of	 new	CEO	 equity	 incentives	 in	 response	 to	 deviations	 between	 existing	 incentives	






Imagine	 a	 different	 approach	 to	 using	 equity	 to	 align	 incentives.	
Suppose	that	a	firm	hired	a	new	CEO	(Build	and	Hold)	and	for	the	first	five	
years	 of	 her	 tenure	 paid	 her	 largely	 in	 equity	 that	 she	 was	 required	 to	
retain	until	she	left	the	company.	Suppose	after	five	years	Build	and	Hold	
held	 1%	 of	 the	 company’s	 shares.	 In	 subsequent	 years,	 suppose	 the	
company	paid	Build	and	Hold	with	cash	only—not	simply	“pay	for	pulse”	
salary—but	 a	 combination	 of	 salary,	 annual	 bonus,	 and	 long‐term	
incentive	pay,	all	in	cash.20	
Compare	 Build	 and	 Hold	 to	 her	 more	 typical	 peer	 who	 receives	
annual	 equity	 grants	 throughout	 his	 career	 (In	 and	 Out).	 Suppose	 that	
those	 annual	 grants	 are	 calibrated	 so	 that	 In	 and	 Out	 holds	 1%	 of	 firm	
equity	after	 five	years	and	continues	to	hold	1%	afterwards.	 In	this	case,	
after	 the	 end	 of	 the	 five‐year	 ramp	 up	 period,	 In	 and	 Out’s	 equity	 sales	
would	match	his	grants.	
Build	 and	 Hold,	 who	 sells	 no	 shares	 during	 her	 tenure,	 cannot	 be	




Goldman	 is	 typical	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 firm	 equity	 constitutes	 a	 large	
fraction	of	the	annual	compensation	of	senior	managers	throughout	their	
careers,	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 large	 majority	 of	 the	 shares	 received	 are	
disposed	of	should	not	be	viewed	in	itself	as	undermining	or	diminishing	
incentives.	 This	 is	 simply	 how	Goldman,	 like	most	 firms,	 has	 decided	 to	
manage	equity	reservoirs.22	
 
20. Although	 rarely	 seen,	 this	 approach	 is	 not	 completely	 hypothetical.	 In	 fact,	 as	 a	
condition	of	making	a	major	investment	in	Goldman	during	the	height	of	the	financial	crisis,	
Warren	Buffett	required	that	the	CEO,	COO,	and	CFO	of	Goldman	continue	to	hold	90%	of	
the	 equity	held	by	 them	at	 the	 time	of	 his	 investment	 for	 the	duration	of	his	 investment.	





outflow	 or	 is	 simply	 filled	 and	 held.	 It	 is	 possible,	 however,	 that	more	 recently	 acquired	
equity	is	more	salient	to	the	holder	and	creates	stronger	incentives	than	“old”	equity.	This	








Per	 section	 16(a),	 executives	 of	 public	 companies	 are	 required	 to	
report	transactions	in	company	shares	within	two	days	of	their	trades	and	
this	 trading	 data	 is	 immediately	 disclosed	 to	 the	 public.23	 Jackson	
surmises	that	section	16(a)	reporting	discourages	managerial	equity	sales	





sales	 is	 somewhat	 different	 than	 Jackson’s.	 In	 thinking	 about	 this	
relationship,	we	need	 to	 consider	 several	dimensions—individual	versus	
firm‐level	incentives,	differences	in	impact	on	managers	at	different	levels	
within	 the	 hierarchy,	 and	 permanent	 versus	 temporary	 effects	 of	
disclosure	requirements.	
1.	Market	 Signals.	 —	 As	 Jackson	 notes,	 if	 disclosed,	 stock	 sales	 by	
managers	 can	 be	 read	 by	 the	market	 as	 an	 indication	 of	 negative	 inside	
information.25	Of	course,	informed	observers	will	realize	that	large	annual	




some	difficulty	 in	 distinguishing	 uninformed	 sales	 that	 simply	 represent	
rebalancing	from	informed	sales	One	would	think	that	adverse	inferences	
could	 be	 avoided	 by	 committing	 to	 hands‐off	 pre‐programmed	 selling	
arrangements,	 but,	 as	 Jackson	 notes,	 there	 is	 evidence	 that	 even	 these	
arrangements	are	susceptible	to	informed	trading.26	
But	 in	 what	 way	 does	 the	 creation	 of	 an	 adverse	 market	 signal	
represent	 a	private	 cost	 for	managers?	 The	 impact	 of	 a	 negative	market	




in	 their	 companies,	 but	 this	 cost	 is	 quite	 diffuse.	 Sales	 by	 one	manager	
have	 a	 small	 impact	 on	 the	 value	 of	 all	 the	 firm’s	 shares,	 including	 that	
manager’s	shares.	A	manager	enjoys	100%	of	the	diversification	benefit	of	
selling	 shares	 and	 only	 a	 small	 fraction	 of	 the	 cost.	 There	 is	 an	 obvious	










managers	 would	 avoid	 diversification	 sales	 to	 protect	 against	 the	
possibility	of	a	negative	impact	on	share	price.	






major	 source	 of	 revenue	 for	 banks	 pre‐crisis,	 tend	 to	 have	 little	 human	
capital	invested	in	a	particular	bank	and	are	exposed	to	a	potential	decline	









may	 convey	 inside	 information	 that	 is	 not	 widely	 available	 within	 the	
firm.30	 However,	 one	 would	 think	 that	 in	 a	 company	 in	 which	 equity	
compensation	 represents	 a	 large	 fraction	 of	 compensation	 for	 all	 senior	
managers,	 insiders	 would	 be	 even	 more	 sensitive	 to	 the	 need	 for	
managing	personal	stock	holdings	through	regular	dispositions.	Moreover,	
one	would	think	that	signals	would	be	less	ambiguous	inside	a	firm	given	
on‐going	 relationships	 and	 improved	 information.	 Colleagues	who	 know	
that	 your	 twins	 were	 just	 accepted	 at	 Yale	 are	 unlikely	 to	 read	 a	 large	
stock	sale	as	signaling	a	lack	of	confidence	or	commitment.	
Jackson	also	argues	that	even	if	sales	don’t	provide	a	negative	signal	
with	respect	 to	current	 confidence	or	commitment,	 these	sales	 “convey[]	
to	colleagues	that	the	executive	has	less	of	a	financial	interest	in	the	firm’s	
long‐term	 value”	 going	 forward.31	 But	 less	 of	 an	 interest	 compared	 to	




27. See,	 e.g.,	 Matthew	 T.	 Bodie,	 Aligning	 Incentives	 with	 Equity:	 Employee	 Stock	
Options	and	Rule	10B‐5,	88	Iowa	L.	Rev.	539,	575	(2003)	(noting	that	“high‐level	managers	
and	 executives	 have	 much	 greater	 proximity	 and	 access	 to	 the	 type	 of	 information	 that	
affects	the	price	of	the	company’s	stock”).	












lead	 to	 an	 adverse	 reaction	 in	 the	 financial	 press.32	 While	 I	 agree	 in	
general	 that	 executives	 are	 sensitive	 to	 press	 coverage,33	 the	 impact	 in	
this	 case	may	 be	 limited.	 First,	 only	 extremely	 large	 sales	 result	 in	 any	
significant	 press	 coverage,	 and	 large	 sales	 can	 be	 avoided	 through	
adopting	 a	 regular	 program	 of	 stock	 sales.34	 Second,	 even	 if	 executives	
bunch	 their	 sales,	 only	 the	 most	 senior	 executives	 are	 likely	 to	 sell	
sufficient	stock	at	one	time	to	attract	press	coverage.	Again,	to	the	extent	
that	 there	 is	 an	 impact,	 it	 seems	 likely	 to	 be	 limited	 to	 the	most	 senior	
executives.	
C.	Timing	Issues	and	Other	Caveats	
In	 sum,	 I	 agree	 with	 Jackson	 that	 there	 is	 a	 theoretical	 basis	 for	
anticipating	 that	 public	 disclosure	 would	 impact	 equity	 disposition	 by	
managers.	 However,	 any	 disincentive	 would	 seem	 to	 be	 greater	 for	 the	
most	senior	executives	than	for	more	junior	managers	who	are	less	likely	
to	 be	 influenced	 by	 private	 benefits	 of	 control	 or	 to	 fear	 adverse	 press	
coverage.	
There	 is,	 moreover,	 a	 question	 of	 timing.	 Would	 we	 expect	 public	
disclosure	to	have	a	greater	impact	on	equity	sales	and	equity	holdings	in	
steady	 state	 or	 on	 the	 timing	 of	 sales	 by	 managers	 who	 can	 anticipate	
becoming	 subject	 to	 these	 obligations?	 Shifting	 of	 stock	 sales	 outside	 of	




would	 seem	 to	 be	 much	 less	 costly	 than	 deferring	 sales	 for	 the	 entire	
period	 that	 a	 manager	 may	 be	 subjected	 to	 a	 public	 disclosure	
requirement.	
Note,	moreover,	that	bunching	sales	prior	to	or	just	following	a	period	
of	 required	 disclosure	 is	 only	 partially	 in	 the	 individual	 manager’s	
interest.	It	is	largely	in	the	firm’s	interest.	Given	the	possibility	that	insider	
stock	sales	may	be	misinterpreted	by	the	market	and	given	the	firm‐level	





SHO13	ALI‐ABA	893,	902	 (2002)	 (noting	 that	pre‐programmed	stock	 sales	plans	 that	 are	
encouraged	under	SEC	Rule	10b5‐1	“make	it	possible	to	spread	sales	and	other	transactions	




publicly	 disclosed	 sales	 of	 stock	 by	 insiders.	 One	 legal	 way	 of	 doing	 so	
would	be	to	encourage	executives	to	bunch	diversification‐based	sales	 in	
the	 period	 prior	 to	 their	 becoming	 subject	 to	 public	 disclosure	
requirements.	 Firms	 would	 also	 encourage	 executives	 who	 are	 soon	 to	
retire	and	leave	public	disclosure	status	to	defer	diversification	sales	until	
they	are	no	longer	subject	to	the	disclosure	requirements.	
These	 two	 points—the	 differential	 effect	 of	 equity	 disposition	
disclosure	on	managers	at	different	levels	of	the	hierarchy	and	the	timing	
question—should	 be	 borne	 in	mind	 as	 we	 consider	 the	 evidence	 of	 the	
impact	 of	 section	 16(a)	 disclosure	 on	 dispositions	 at	 Goldman	 and	 the	
implications	 thereof.	 Also,	 before	 we	 turn	 to	 the	 data,	 it	 is	 worth	 a	
reminder	here	that	Goldman	binds	its	senior	managers	to	a	shareholders’	
agreement	that	both	restricts	their	sales	of	Goldman	stock	and	results	 in	
disclosure	 of	 trades	 by	 a	 large	 number	 of	managers—not	 section	 16(a)	
disclosure,	but	internal	disclosure	that	is	ultimately	reported	on	Schedule	
13D.35	Jackson	argues	that,	given	the	uniqueness	of	this	arrangement	and	
the	 obscurity	 of	 the	 13D	 filings,	 the	 market	 does	 not	 respond	 to	 this	
information	in	the	same	way	that	it	responds	to	section	16(a)	filings,	and	
he	has	evidence	to	back	this	up.36	Even	if	that	is	right,	however,	there	is	no	
reason	 to	 think	 that	 the	 internal	 Goldman	 market	 ignores	 these	
disclosures.	All	of	these	Goldman	managers	disclose	their	own	sales,	know	
















37. There	 is	 undoubtedly	 a	 timing	 difference.	 Schedule	 13D	 reports	 are	 not	 filed	 as	
soon	after	trades	as	the	reports	required	by	section	16(a).	Compare	SEC	Rule	13d‐2(a),	17	
CFR	§	240.13d‐2	 (2011)	 (requiring	 amended	 schedules	13D	 to	be	 filed	 “promptly”),	with	
SEC	Mandated	Electronic	 Filing	 and	Web	 Site	 Posting	 for	 Forms	 3,	 4	 and	 5,	 68	 Fed.	 Reg.	
25,788	 (May	 13,	 2003)	 (codified	 in	 scattered	 parts	 of	 17	 C.F.R.)	 (requiring	 section	 16(a)	
disclosure	of	trades	within	two	days).	But	unlike	external	market	signals	that	are	used	for	




information	 that	 is	 aggregated	 in	 the	 Schedule	 13D	 that	 is	 filed	 for	 this	





Jackson’s	 principal	 empirical	 strategy	 is	 to	 utilize	 sales	 data	 for	
managers	 not	 subject	 to	 section	 16(a)	 reporting	 requirements	 to	
investigate	 the	 impact	 of	 section	 16(a)	 disclosure	 on	 sales	 activity.41	
Jackson	has	two	approaches.	First,	because	the	membership	of	the	section	
16(a)	 executive	 group	 changes	 over	 time,	 Jackson	 can	 compare	 sales	 by	
the	same	individuals	during	periods	in	which	they	are	and	are	not	subject	
to	 section	 16(a)	 reporting	 requirements.	 Jackson	 finds	 a	 statistically	
significant	relationship	between	section	16(a)	reporting	status	and	sales,	
with	these	 individuals	selling	four	times	as	much	stock	when	not	subject	
to	 section	 16(a)	 reporting.42	 Jackson	 also	 finds	 that	 Goldman	managers	
“unload”	 shares	 in	 anticipation	 of	 becoming	 subjected	 to	 section	 16(a)	
reporting.	For	example,	he	finds	that	average	sales	in	the	two	years	prior	
to	attaining	executive	officer	status	are	about	three	times	greater	than	in	
the	 subsequent	 section	 16(a)	 reporting	 years,	 and	 this	 difference	 is	
significant	at	a	99%	confidence	level.43	
Jackson’s	 second	approach	 to	unpacking	 the	 impact	of	 section	16(a)	
disclosure	 on	 sales	 is	 to	 compare	 sales	 by	 members	 of	 the	 firm’s	
management	committee	who	are	section	16(a)	reporters	to	sales	by	non‐
reporters.	 Again,	 Jackson	 finds	 that	 section	 16(a)	 reporters	 sell	
significantly	 fewer	shares	and	that	the	difference	is	both	statistically	and	
economically	 significant.	 Jackson	 shows	 that	 in	 the	 period	 from	 2000	
through	2009,	 section	16(a)	 reporters	sold	shares	worth	$7.2	million	on	
average	 while	 non‐reporters	 sold	 $9.5	 million	 on	 average.44	 This	 data,	




39. The	 Goldman	 Sachs	 Grp.,	 Inc.,	 Management	 Committee,	
http://www.goldmansachs.com/who‐we‐are/leadership/management‐
committee/index.html	(on	file	with	the	Columbia	Law	Review)	(last	visited	June	16,	2012).	
40. The	 Goldman	 Sachs	 Grp.,	 Inc.,	 Executive	 Officers,	
http://www.goldmansachs.com/who‐we‐are/leadership/executive‐officers/index.html	 (on	
file	with	the	Columbia	Law	Review)	(last	visited	June	16,	2012).	
41. Jackson,	 supra	 note	 2,	 at	 961.	 Jackson	 also	 provides	 data	 on	 the	 relationship	
between	equity	grants	and	sales	at	Goldman,	patterns	in	managerial	ownership	over	time,	
and	differences	in	sales	between	managers	who	receive	relatively	more	and	relatively	less	
equity‐based	 pay.	 In	 this	 response,	 I	 focus	 on	 his	 evidence	 concerning	 the	 relationship	







These	 are	 impressive	 results,	 but	 as	 Jackson	 realizes,	 there	 is	 a	
potentially	 confounding	 factor.	 Some	 of	 the	 section	 16(a)	 reporters	 are	
also	Designated	Senior	Officers	(DSOs)	who	are	contractually	obligated	to	
retain	 75%	 of	 equity	 granted	 to	 them	 instead	 of	 the	 more	 broadly	
applicable	 25%.45	 Currently,	 six	 of	 the	 firm’s	 section	 16(a)	 reporting	
executive	officers—the	firm’s	CEO,	COO,	CFO,	and	three	Vice	Chairmen—
are	DSOs.46	So	the	challenge	for	Jackson	is	to	show	that	public	disclosure	
inhibits	 equity	 disposition	 independently	 of	 the	 sometimes	 overlapping	
heightened	 contractual	 retention	 obligation.	 The	 differences	 in	 sales	 for	
disclosure	 and	non‐disclosure	 years,47	 the	 ramp	up	 in	 sales	 prior	 to	 the	






16(a)	 reporters	 at	 some	 point	 during	 that	 period.50	 His	 dependent	
variable	 is	 sales	 and	 he	 includes	 two	 dummy	 variables—one	 for	 the	
presence	of	a	section	16(a)	reporting	obligation;	the	other	for	DSO	status	
and	the	attendant	heightened	contractual	retention	obligation.	Controlling	
for	 DSO	 status,	 Jackson	 finds	 that	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 section	
16(a)	 reporting	obligation	and	sales	 is	 significant	at	 the	99%	confidence	
level.51	This	 is	 the	key	 evidence	 that	public	disclosure	dampened	equity	




for	 example,	 that	 Goldman’s	 executives	 are	 better	 able	 to	 anticipate	 the	





Goldman	 managers.52	 As	 long	 as	 some	 members	 of	 the	 section	 16(a)	
 
45. See	supra	note	16	and	accompanying	text.	







52. Id.	 at	 964.	 The	 Goldman	 Sachs	 IPO	 occurred	 in	 1999.	 Senior	 managers	 were	
subjected	to	additional	restrictions	on	selling	shares	during	a	“lockup”	period	that	extended	
into	 2004.	 Id.	 However,	 as	 Jackson	 notes,	 lockup	 restrictions	 could	 be	 waived	 and	 were	
waived	 during	 this	 period,	 id.	 n.41,	 raising	 the	 possibility	 of	 differing	 treatment	 of	 top	
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reporting	 group	 are	 subject	 to	 retention	 obligations	 that	 are	 not	 shared	
(or	 shared	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent)	 by	 non‐section	 16(a)	 reporters,	 there	will	
always	 be	 some	uncertainty	 regarding	 the	 influence	 of	 public	 disclosure	
per	se.	
Nonetheless,	 I	 am	 convinced	 that	 1)	 Jackson	 has	 provided	 solid	
evidence	 for	 the	 dampening	 effect	 he	 theorizes	 and	 2)	 he	 has	 done	
everything	 possible	 to	 isolate	 that	 effect.	 In	 conversations	 I	 had	 with	
Jackson	in	preparing	this	response,	I	learned	of	other	robustness	tests	that	
he	 conducted	 that	 are	 not	 discussed	 in	 the	 Essay.	 For	 example,	 in	 one	
analysis,	 Jackson	 limited	 the	 sample	 to	 individuals	who	were	 sometimes	
subject	 to	 section	 16(a)	 but	 never	 subject	 to	 heightened	 contractual	






constraints.	 I	 would	 encourage	 Jackson	 to	 create	 an	 on‐line	 appendix	
where	 interested	 readers	 could	 go	 to	 find	 more	 detailed	 regression	
results,	 further	 discussion	 of	 robustness	 tests,	 and	 more	 detail	 on	 the	
sample.	 For	 example,	while	DSOs	 account	 for	 60%	of	 Goldman’s	 section	
16(a)	 reporters	 currently,	 I	 understand	 that	 over	 the	 entire	 ten‐year	
period	 investigated	 (which	 ended	 with	 2009),	 DSOs	 accounted	 for	 only	
about	 25%	 of	 section	 16(a)	 reporters,	 on	 average.54	 Intuitively,	 as	 the	
number	 of	 individuals	 subject	 to	 heightened	 contractual	 retention	
obligations	falls	relative	to	the	overall	section	16(a)	reporting	population,	





convincing	 evidence	 that	 the	 answer	 is	 yes.	 This	 is	 a	 significant	 step	
forward,	 but	 unfortunately	 the	 Goldman	 data	 cannot	 resolve	 two	
important	questions	that	arise	in	attempting	to	interpret	that	result.	First,	
is	 the	 dampening	 effect	 an	 ongoing,	 steady‐state	 phenomenon	 or	 a	 one‐
 
managers	and	managers	further	down	in	the	hierarchy.	
53. E‐mail	 from	Robert	 J.	 Jackson,	 Jr.,	Assoc.	Professor	of	Law,	Columbia	Law	Sch.,	 to	
David	I.	Walker,	Professor	of	Law,	Maurice	Poch	Faculty	Research	Scholar,	and	Assoc.	Dean	
for	 Academic	 Affairs,	 Bos.	 Univ.	 Sch.	 of	 Law	 (May	 16,	 2012,	 8:51	 PM	 EDT)	 (on	 file	 with	
author).	Jackson	does	not	report	this	data	in	the	Essay	because	the	section	16(a)	executives	
who	 are	 not	 DSOs	 generally	 are	 not	 bankers,	 but	 are	 legal,	 HR,	 compliance,	 or	 similar	





time	 shifting	 of	 sales?	 Second,	 are	 equity	 dispositions	 by	 lower	 level	












executives	 or	 simply	 the	 timing	 of	 those	 dispositions.	 Jackson	 provides	
evidence	 that	managers	 anticipate	 elevation	 to	 section	 16(a)	 status	 and	
increase	 sales	 in	 the	 years	 prior.	 It	 is	 possible,	 then,	 that	 the	 effect	 is	
simply	 one	 of	 shifting	 and	 bunching	 and	 that	 disclosure	 does	 not	 affect	
average	holdings	over	the	entire	period.	Presumably,	one	would	need	data	
over	a	much	longer	period	during	which	some	managers	are	consistently	
subject	 to	 section	16(a),	while	 others	move	 into	or	 out	 of	 that	 status,	 in	
order	to	determine	whether	there	are	steady‐state	effects.	
To	be	sure,	evidence	that	firms	and/or	individuals	manage	the	timing	
of	 share	 sales	 to	 minimize	 section	 16(a)	 reported	 sales	 would	 be	
important.	 Assuming	 that	 shifting	 behavior	 is	 widespread,	 analysts	
looking	 at	 section	 16(a)	 reports	 to	 assess	 trading	 by	 executives	 would	
need	to	realize	that	they	are	seeing	only	part	of	the	picture	and	that	with	






Professor	 Jackson’s	 research	 is	 partly	 motivated	 by	 the	 following	
idea:	 If	 it	 can	be	shown	that	public	disclosure	 inhibits	equity	disposition	
by	managers,	increasing	the	reach	of	that	disclosure	could	potentially	be	a	










Setting	 aside	 the	 shifting	 issue	 addressed	 above	 and	 assuming	 for	
now	 that	 public	 disclosure	 has	 had	 a	 steady‐state	 impact	 on	 equity	





more	 generally	 as	 one	moves	 beyond	 the	 executive	 suite	 of	most	 public	
companies,	 one	 observes	 a	 qualitative	 change	 in	 roles,	 responsibilities,	
benefits	 of	 control,	 and	 exposure	 to	 the	 press.	 As	 discussed	 above,	 the	




that	are	material	 in	 the	context	of	a	particular	 firm.	Perhaps	the	 internal	
signaling	 story	 is	 most	 plausibly	 applied	 to	 lower	 level	 managers,	
although,	as	I	have	suggested,	I	do	not	think	that	the	Goldman	results	can	
be	 explained	 by	 an	 internal	 signaling	 mechanism	 because	 all	 of	 the	
information	was	readily	available	within	the	firm.	For	all	of	these	reasons,	
it	seems	likely	that	the	top	executives	who	are	already	subject	to	section	
16(a)	 reporting	 at	 their	 companies	 would	 be	 much	 more	 sensitive	 to	
public	disclosure	of	sales	than	their	non‐reporting	underlings.	
Finally,	 suppose	 that	 public	 disclosure	 requirements	 were	 to	 be	
expanded	to	cover	more	managers.	And	suppose	that	these	requirements	
made	 share	 sales	 less	 attractive	 to	 the	 newly	 covered	 managers	 and	
resulted,	 in	 the	 first	 instance,	 in	 increased	 equity	 holdings	 by	 these	
managers.	Is	there	any	reason	to	think	that	firms	could	not	or	would	not	
offset	this	effect	by	reducing	equity	pay	and	increasing	performance‐based	
cash	 compensation?	 Most	 observers	 believe	 that	 the	 top	 executives	
generally	share	 the	stockholders’	 interest	 in	optimizing	 incentives	below	
the	executive	suite.59	Thus,	if	equity	holdings	are	suboptimally	high	or	low	
at	 the	 junior	 executive	 level,	 one	would	 think	 that	 the	 senior	 executives	
would	address	this	problem	by	increasing	or	decreasing	reliance	on	equity	
pay,	 adjusting	 vesting	 requirements,	 or	 through	 other	 contractual	
modifications.	 In	 short,	 even	 if	 public	disclosure	 is	 shown	 to	be	 a	 useful	







long‐term	 shareholder	 value,	 these	 executives	 will	 have	 a	 powerful	 incentive	 to	 adopt	







part	 of	 the	 firm’s	 culture	 that	 the	 partners	 entered	 into	 a	 shareholders’	
agreement	 to	 perpetuate	 that	 culture	within	 the	 newly	 public	 company.	
That	 difference	 alone	 may	 cause	 some	 to	 wonder	 whether	 we	 can	
extrapolate	from	Goldman	to	other	companies.	Perhaps	public	disclosure	





The	 relationship	 between	 public	 disclosure	 of	 stock	 sales	 and	
managerial	 equity	 retention	 is	 an	 important	 one,	 and	 Professor	 Jackson	
has	 provided	 us	 with	 a	 fascinating	 look	 at	 the	 relationship	 at	 one	
important	company—Goldman	Sachs.	Jackson	deserves	tremendous	credit	
for	 identifying	 and	 exploring	 this	 unique	 source	 of	 data	 and	 for	
overcoming—to	 the	 extent	 humanly	 possible—the	 potentially	
confounding	 effect	 of	 differential	 contractual	 retention	 obligations.	
Naturally,	 there	 are	 open	 questions	 regarding	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	
results	 and	 our	 ability	 to	 extrapolate	 from	 them,	 but	 one	 hopes	 that	
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